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THE IMPACT OF BOARD STRUCTURE ON INFORMATION 
SECURITY BREACHES 
 
Tawei Wang, Department of Accounting, National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan, 
twang@ntu.edu.tw 
Carol Hsu, Department of Information Management, National Taiwan University, Taipei, 
Taiwan, carolhsu@ntu.edu.tw 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the association between the board structure of a firm and the possibility of 
information security breaches.  Building on the agency theory and resource dependence theory, we 
hypothesize that the board structure could affect the guidance and advice capability of the board on 
the executives’ decision of information security management.  Our results show that the board size 
and the number of independent directors could increase the possibility of security breaches while the 
average and heterogeneity of age/tenure could reduce it.  Our findings shed lights on the crucial role 
played by the board when managing information security risks in organizations. 





While the advance and commoditization of information communication technology (ICT) bring 
modern organizations the opportunity to achieve and maintain competitiveness in the marketplace, 
organizations are increasingly facing challenges to combat the increasing numbers of external and 
internal threats that exploit organizational vulnerabilities (CSI/FBI 2008; Deloitte 2009).  The 
growing involvement of regulatory thinking also brought a profound impact on the discursive process 
about risk management and corporate governance in organizations, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX) and Basel II.  In the information security management literature, studies on organizational 
aspects are “limited but emerging” (Ransbotham and Mitra 2009, p.122).  Our assessment of the 
literature indicates that most organizational approaches in this area are dominant in the analysis of 
security policy development, risk management, and security effectiveness/misuse.  In our view, 
despite pointing to the significance of top management support in some studies, discussion on the 
impact of organizational structure, such as the board structure and heterogeneity, on the possibility of 
information security breaches is still lacking.  In accordance with the corporate governance literature, 
we argue that the board of directors play a crucial role in influencing managerial actions in managing 
risk and developing policy, which has a consequent impact on the effectiveness of information 
security management program or the possibility of information security breaches in the organization.  
Therefore, our research objective is three-fold.  First, we discuss the conceptual argument about the 
relation between the board structure and information security management.  Second, we attempt to 
identify major variables and develop hypotheses on how the board composition might influence the 
possibility of information security breaches in the organization.  Third, we empirically test the 
proposed hypotheses using the data of the S&P 1500 firms in the Risk Metrics database between 1996 
and 2008.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we discuss the theoretical 
perspectives that are relevant to the board structure and information security management, which is 
followed by the development of hypotheses.  We continue with the description of research 
methodology deployed in this study and the discussion of empirical findings.  Concluding remarks 
include the discussion of contributions and implications of our research. 
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
In this section, we present our conceptual framework linking the relevance between the board 
structure and the effectiveness of information security management from prior literature. 
In information systems literature, information communication technology (ICT) has known for its 
strategic importance for organizational survival and success (Porter 1980).  However, as mentioned 
earlier, the widespread adoption of information technology infrastructure has recently brought 
managerial and scholarly attention on its side effect, i.e., the risks associated with the technology 
diffusion (e.g., Carr 2003; Ciborra 2006).  Further assessing the information security management 
literature, we found that the organizational aspect of research is still relatively limited compared with 
the research on its technical counterpart.  Within the organizational perspective, the majority of 
studies on risk management have centred on the description of various frameworks (Bandyopadhyay 
et al. 1999; Baskerville 2008; Eloff 1993; Karabacak 2005; Mattord and Wiant 2008; Rainer et al. 
1991) or its the implementation process and its effectiveness (Dhillon and Backhouse 1996; Straub 
1990; Straub and Nance 1990; Straub and Welke 1998).  However, if one follows the arguments put 
forward by Carr (2003) and Ciborra (2006), together with the legislative development, the strategic 
importance of effective information security management is apparent and should be addressed in the 
research.  With the emphasis on the strategic imperative, we further contend that the board 
composition and structure hence become important in this context as they are influential in a firm’s 
strategic direction and performance.  To the best of our knowledge, no research yet has examined the 




The design and composition of the board is widely discussed and examined in the area of corporate 
governance research (e.g., Baysinger and Butler 1985; Core et al. 1999).  Drawing from the agency 
theory, the board is an important control mechanism that serves to protect the interest of shareholder 
from the self-interested executives (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Walsh and Seward 1990).  However, 
others have adopted the resource dependence theory and considered the value of directors as the 
provision and access to other resources beyond the organizational boundary.  In this research, we 
consider that both theoretical perspectives are highly relevant to the effectiveness of information 
security management.  First, unlike other organizational investment, organizational spending on 
information security seldom generates strategic return on organizational performance.  Although 
many organizations have implemented information security over the past decade (e.g., Dhillon and 
Backhouse 2001; Cavusoglu et al. 2005; D’Arcy 2009; Gordon, et al 2006; Hsu 2009; Ransbotham 
and Mita 2009), it is still difficult to persuade top management to invest the appropriate amount in 
information security programs.  Thus, to protect the reputation and prevent the financial loss caused 
by security breaches, the board is imperative in ensuring sufficient managerial attention and 
investment in information security.  Second, given the swift change in technology and business 
environment, organizations constantly face the challenges of dealing with uncertain threats that might 
exploit organizational vulnerabilities.  From the viewpoint of resource dependency theory, the value 
of the board then lies in the provision of professional experience and opinions to enhance the 
managerial capacity in developing a sound risk management approach.  Put together, we have 
developed the correspondent hypotheses as detailed below. 
First, prior literature regarding board structure has focused on the size of the board (e.g., Beasley 1996; 
Dalton et al. 1999).  Based on our discussion in the previous paragraph, the larger the size of the 
board, the stronger the control function is and the more knowledge and experience of these directors 
have to the management team.  From this viewpoint, the size of the board can reduce the possibility of 
information security breaches.  However, in the context of information security, the uncertainty faced 
by a firm changes rapidly, a larger group of directors can also complicate and slow down the decision-
making process at the board meeting (e.g., Olson 1982).  That is, a larger board might hinder the 
organization’s capability of responding to the environmental change (e.g., Goodstein et al. 1994; 
Harrison 1987).  This implies that the size of the board could increase the possibility of information 
security breaches.  Since both theoretical arguments from the literature could be true when applying to 
the context of information security, we set up two competing hypotheses as in Hypothesis 1a and 1b. 
Hypothesis 1a. The number of the board of directors is positively associated with the possibility of 
information security breaches. 
Hypothesis 1b. The number of the board of directors is negatively associated with the possibility of 
information security breaches. 
Second, the volatile technology and business environment often limits the capability of top 
management in making a well-informed decision.  As the resource dependence theory indicates, the 
composition of the board plays an important role in sourcing the knowledge to support the corporate 
information security management.  In the literature, age and tenure are the two factors that are 
commonly discussed about the composition of the board (e.g., Carter et al. 2002; Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1989; Johnson et al. 1993; Robinson and Deschant 1997).  The main argument in this 
stream of literature is that the age and tenure is associated with the director’s experience and 
capabilities.  In our context, the older the directors are and/or the longer the tenure the directors means 
that these directors have accumulated a wealth of experience and know-how, which allows them in a 
better position to advise managers when dealing with information security management issues faced 
by the organization.  On the other hand, the heterogeneity of age/tenure allows the board to have a 
diversity of information and a wide variety of viewpoints (e.g., Johnson et al. 1993; Wiersema and 
Bantel 1992) which could also negatively associated with breaches.  Same as the argument presented 
earlier, the diversity on age/tenure could reduce the communications among the directors (e.g., Zenger 
and Lawrence 1989) and hinder the decision making which could oppositely increase the possibility 
of breaches.  Similarly, since we are not able to determine the impact of the heterogeneity of 





Hypothesis 2. The average age/tenure of the directors is negatively associated with the possibility of 
information security breaches. 
Hypothesis 3a. The heterogeneity of age/tenure of the directors is positively associated with the 
possibility of information security breaches. 
Hypothesis 3b. The heterogeneity of age/tenure of the directors is negatively associated with the 
possibility of information security breaches. 
Another rationale concerning the value of the board is their link to outside resources and connection 
to the external environment (e.g., Hillman and Dalziel 2003).  The link is developed through the set-
up of independent directors.  We found that the independent directors serve different purposes 
depending on what theoretical lens was deployed.  One school of thoughts focuses on independent 
directors from the perspective of agency cost or monitoring cost such as Forker (1992), Klein (2002), 
Raheja (2005), and Drymiotes (2007).  From the resource dependence perspective and in the context 
of information security, inside (employee or affiliated) directors compose the internal knowledge 
about the value and risk associated with the internal operation and business process while outside 
director offers the experiences and knowledge associated with the emerging risks which might be 
overlooked by the internal management.  Accordingly, as the number of independent directors 
increases, the internal knowledge might not be enough to guide the executives risk managing behavior. 
Hypothesis 4. The number of independent directors is positively associated with the possibility of 
information security breaches. 
3 SAMPLE AND RESEARCH MODELS 
3.1 Data Collection and Measures 
In order to approach our research questions, we used all the S&P 1500 firms from 1996 to 2008 as our 
sample.  The data of the board of the directors was collected from the Risk Metrics database.  From 
the database, we calculated the number of directors and the number of independent directors for each 
firm-year.  We also gathered the information about age and tenure for each director for each firm-year. 
We then identified information security breach announcements from 1996 to 2008 in the major media 
outlets.  We searched the Wall Street Journal, USA Today, the Washington Post, and the New York 
Times using the Factiva database as well as the CNet and ZDNet websites for 13 different keywords 
as indicated in prior literature (e.g., Campbell et al. 2003; Garg et al. 2003; Wang et al. 2009).  From 
the details of these information security breach announcements, we carried out an exercise of cross-
check with the sample of S&P 1500 firms.  If a firm in our sample had breach announcements, we 
coded the variable Breach as 1, 0 otherwise.  The resulting sample size is 3,034 and consists of the 
firms from 63 industries. 
3.2 Measures and Research Models 
To operationalize our research objective, we decide to use the average amount for each measure in our 
sample period as detailed below.  The average amount also helps us control the fluctuation across 
years.  For Hypothesis 1, we calculated the average number of directors for each firm from 1996 to 
2008 (BSize).  For Hypothesis 2, we first calculated the average age (in years) and tenure (in days) for 
each firm year.  Then we average again what we obtained above through our sample period (avgAge 
and avgTenure).  For Hypothesis 3, we use the commonly adopted measure “coefficient of variation” 
to capture the heterogeneity of age and tenure (Williams and O’Reilly 1998) which equals the 
standard deviation divided by the mean of age and tenure (CVAge and CVTenure).  For Hypothesis 4, 
the average number of independent directors was calculated.  Last, we control for firm size (CSize, in 




We have missing values when we search the S&P 1500 firm in the Risk Metrics database.  
Accordingly, there are fewer observations for the board structure measures which result in a total 
sample size of 2254.  Note that the size of the firm (CSize) is positively and significantly correlated 
with board size (BSize) and the size of independent directors (IBSize) (0.625, p < 0.01 and 0.548, p < 
0.01 respectively).  Also, as expected, the board size (BSize) and the size of independent directors 
(IBSize) are highly correlated (0.799, p < 0.01).  We recognize that such a correlation could be 
problematic when including these variables in the same model.  Therefore, we take the residuals by 
regressing the size of the firm (CSize) on the board size (BSize) as an orthogonal measure for our 
analyses as presented in the following section.  In addition, we will have two separate models for the 
board size and the size of independent directors. 
Based on our measures, we use Equation (1) and Equation (2) below to test our Hypotheses.  The 
dependent variable for these equations is Breach.  In these two equations, other variables are those 
defined earlier, where the βj are the coefficients and ε1 and ε2 are the residual terms.  We estimate the 
coefficients using the logistic regression model. 
iiiiiiii CVTenureCVAgeavgTenureavgAgeBSizeCSizeBreach 16543210 εβββββββ +++++++=   
(1) 
iiiiiiii CVTenureCVAgeavgTenureavgAgeIBSizeCSizeBreach 26543210 εβββββββ +++++++= (
2) 
4 ANALYSIS AND RESULT 
The results are given in Table 1.  For Equation (1) (the second column in Table 1), all the variables 
are significant except the average tenure of the directors (avgTenure).  The significant positive 
coefficient (0.2466, p < 0.01) for the variable BSize supports our Hypothesis 1a that it is more likely 
to have security breaches when the size of the board is larger.  This presents an interesting finding 
compared to the existing literature on board size and firm performance.  In the management literature, 
scholarly evidence suggests that board size tends to positively associated with the firm performance 
and could provide more external resources to the firm (e.g., Daily and Johnson 1997; Dalton et al. 
1999; Gilson 1990; Pfeffer 1978).  A large board can provide a stronger governance power which 
would reduce the dominance of managers and improve decisions (e.g., Zahra and Pearce 1989).  
Nevertheless, from the information security management perspective, the findings shed some lights 
on how to balance the pool of knowledge and the speed of decision-making required in managing 
information security risks.  A larger board size might offer the merit of knowledge pool on the other 
hand could hinder the quality and process of decision-making.  The quality of decision regarding 
information security in turn affects the effectiveness of security management and the firm’s future 
uncertainty.  Our results offer the empirical evidence that when the board size grows, the benefit of 
accessing to a diverse knowledge might become counterproductive from the standpoint of decision-
making quality. 
The above finding suggests an important theoretical thinking in effective information security 
management, that is, board size might not be the answer but the board composition matters (e.g., 
Knyazeva et al. 2009).  In our analysis of board trait, the results indicate that the older the directors of 
the board, the smaller the possibility of breach (the coefficient of avgAge is -0.1183, p < 0.01 for 
Equation (1) and -0.1202 for Equation (2), p < 0.01).  Focusing on the issue of board heterogeneity, 
the results for Equation (1) in Table 1 also support Hypothesis 3b (the coefficient of CVAge is -0.0453 
for Equation (1), p < 0.01 and -0.0971 for Equation (2), p < 0.10; the coefficient of CVTenure is -
0.2854, p < 0.01 and -0.3448, p < 0.05 for Equation (1) and (2) respectively).  The result confirms the 
idea of “board capital” in prior studies (Hillman and Dalziel 2003).  In particular, the board provides 
important expertise and skills to the provision of advice and counsel (e.g., Baysinger and Butler 1985; 
Gales and Kesner 1994).  In addition, prior literature suggests that the heterogeneity within a group 
can reduce the possibility of inertia (e.g., Kiesler and Sproul 1982) and can reduce social cohension of 
the board (Michel and Hambrick, 1992).  Heterogeneity tends to offers positive contribution to the 




context, our finding suggests that experience plays an important role when facing security risks.  The 
development of a security management program including the security policy, management 
committee, team structure (e.g., CISO or security officers), risk management process and employee 
education can preserve the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information in organizations.  
All these tasks require an enterpris-wide implementation and demand the talences and skills of 
management to executive them well.  Furthermore, the depth of managerial experiencs from the board 
becomes singinficantly invaluable to the top managemnt team. 
 
Variable Equation (1) Equation (2)  
Intercept 2.2252 3.4542**  
CSize 1.6752*** 1.6638***  
BSize 0.2466***  H1a supported 
IBSize  0.2805*** H4 supported 
avgAge -0.1183*** -0.1202*** 
avgTenure 0.0000 -0.0000 H2 supported 
CVAge -0.0453*** -0.0971* 














*** significant at 1%  ** significant at 5%  * significant at 10% 
Table 1. Results 
For Equation (2) (the third column in Table 1), the result supports Hypothesis 4 that the number of 
independent directors is positively associated with breaches (the coefficient of IBSize is 0.2805, p < 
0.01).  Prior literature has shown that though outside directors could provide their experience and 
outside resources to the firm (e.g., Ellstrand et al. 2002), they might not have enough time and internal 
knowledge to make informed decisions especially when the decision requires knowledge of the firm’s 
capabilities (e.g., Baysinger and Hoskisson 1990; Lorsch and MacIver 1989).  In our information 
security context, it is inevitable to understand how a firm’s strategy interacts with its environment and 
its capabilities (Applegate et al. 2009).  Accordingly, the board needs to have more internal 
knowledge of value and risk when facing information security challenges.  Therefore, the guidance 
function of the board is more important than the monitoring function in the security context.   
5 IMPLICATION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study focuses on the guidance role played by the board of directors of a firm and investigates 
how the board structure would affect the effectiveness of security management which is proxied by 
the possibility of breaches.  Our results suggest that the size of the board could hinder the quality of 
decision while the average age and the heterogeneity of age/tenure of the board could enrich the 
viewpoints the managers have when setting security policies.  Furthermore, different from the prior 
literature, the number of independent directors becomes an indicator of how well the internal 
information about daily business the board can have and the management of information security. 
This paper highlights the need for the consideration and investigation into the impact of the board 
structure on the effectiveness of information security management in organizations.  We extend our 
empirical support to the conceptualization of ‘duality of risk’ (Ciborra 2006) and IT as infrastructure 
(Carr 2003) in organizations.  That is, the board of directors does not only affect the organizational 
performance of the firm as indicated by prior literature, thy play an important role in information 
security management in organizations.  From this angle, we add values to the existing literature on the 
organizational aspects of IS security.  Our early work here presents exploratory results on the 
relationship between the board structure and information security breaches, but further work is needed 




future studies can look into the relevance of different types of resources and its impact on 
organizational effectiveness of information security management. 
From the practical perspective, the directors need to consider both the value of IT and the potential 
risk and consequences that might follow.  This also has practical implications on the appropriate 
training and education offered to the directors.  Drawing from our study, we argue that it might 
become necessary to offer information security risk management education to the board of directors.  
Such education is important to facilitate the directors in articulating corporate strategy for information 
security management.  Though our findings do not suggest an optimal board structure and 
composition, we point out the elements that need to be paid attention to when forming the board or 
given the current board structure and composition a firm has.  Since generally larger firms have larger 
board size, the quality of decision becomes an issue when managing security risks.  Also, firms need 
to focus more on the communication within different age/tenure groups and how to better utilize 
outside resources independent directors can have.  Last, though external resources are valuable to the 
firm, it needs to balance the industry-wide as well as the enterprise-wide knowledge when looking for 
independent directors especially when the firm faces larger uncertainty in terms of information 
security. 
In summary, this research argues for the strategic imperative of board composition on the 
effectiveness of information security management in organizations.  We further conduct an 
exploratory empirical investigation to support the relevance of the above argument.  Given the 
dynamics of information security management and the diversity of board structure, more theoretical 
and empirical enquiries can strengthen our understanding on this area.  And we hope that our work 
here offers the starting point to inspire further research in this area.  
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